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Challenges of translating C. S. Lewis's *The Problem of Pain* into Polish and Spanish by professional translators – comparative and evaluative perspectives

ABSTRACT

Challenges of translating C. S. Lewis's *The Problem of Pain* into Polish and Spanish by professional translators – comparative and evaluative perspectives

The article discusses diverse translation challenges which translators may be confronted with while working on target-language renditions of C. S. Lewis's *The Problem of Pain*. To present his thoughts and theses, this famous British writer, philosopher, philologist, and Anglican lay theologian was using vivid language, teeming with a mixture of academic/formal theological terminology with more informal vocabulary. Thus, I conduct a comparative (descriptive and evaluative) analysis of the English original version and its four official translations (two Polish and two Spanish ones). The analysed excerpts were selected with a view to reveal the richness of Lewis's language and style, mainly in terms of lexis, morphology, and syntax. The main research tools that I employ throughout the study are Berman's (1992) theory on first translations and retranslations, House's (2001) model of translation quality assessment, and the classification of translation techniques created by Molina and Hurtado Albir (2002). The results reveal a plethora of choices made by the Polish and Spanish translators in question, ranging from a cautious approach towards the original text (which manifest mainly in resorting to literal translation) to a more creative and adventurous "behaviour" (which is realised through the application of amplification, particularisation, modulation, and transposition, among others). The conclusions cut across the combination of linguistic and extralinguistic factors (such as sociocultural, idiosyncratic, and the like) and are formulated on comparatively descriptive and evaluative planes.

Keywords: pain, theological discourse, Lewis's stylistic diversity, translation techniques, retranslation, English, Polish, Spanish

1. Introduction

It is stating the obvious that talking/writing about such a multi-faceted phenomenon as pain is no easy matter. It is even more so when such considerations are thrown into the philosophical and theological mould, as is the case with C. S. Lewis's work *The Problem of Pain* (1940). The author addresses the issue of broadly understood existential pain present not only in humans, but also in animals, setting his elaborations against the background of Christian theology. He additionally illustrates his thoughts and theses with multiple vivid examples, anecdotes, and stories, something that, in the case of many readers, drives the point home and makes the reading absorbing and attractive, but may be equally confusing, and even more so during the translation process. Thus, the problematic and complex subject matter of the book is one aspect, but the rendition of its content into other languages is another one, and it poses a challenge for translators. In this paper I shall take a closer look at selected excerpts from four official/professional translations of Lewis's book (two Polish and two Spanish ones), highlighting those fragments that appeared to be problematic in translation for diverse reasons, sometimes to the point of tripping the translator up on specific portions of text (the result being overinterpretation, equivocation, or vagueness). However, my focus here is the translators' approach to Lewis's language, that is all situations illustrating the ways in which these translators "embrace" and deal with specific manifestations of language, especially at the lexical, morphological, and syntactic levels.

2. Methodological underpinnings

The analysis that ensues may be generally viewed as the exploration of idiosyncratic and externally-conditioned (e.g. socio-cultural) contrastive choices made in the context of translating Lewis's work at the interface of English, Polish, and Spanish. There is a number of important methodological tenets to be considered prior to the analysis proper.

The first premise of this study is that a particular translator should be viewed against the background of the *developmental* nature of translation as a human skill. As Whyatt asserts,

[...] it is only fair to suggest that the individual performance of the person who translates will reflect the place on the developmental continuum of translation as a human skill. This developmental perspective makes room for all kinds of translators and for all kinds of translations produced. The translator-in-the-making is always somewhere on the developmental continuum from being able to make use of the natural ability to translate throughout the process of developing specific skills towards achieving translation competence and expertise (Wyatt 2012: 34).

Secondly, apart from explicitly stated internal conditioning like the natural ability to translate, the “making” and the development of the translator is also determined by a number of external factors, since

[t]he translator's decisions are themselves an intricate complex in which world-views, world knowledge, ideologies, values, cognitive or psychological features, aesthetics and audience factors intermingle and position the outcome, i.e. the translated text (Ionescu/Nicolae 2012: 187).

For these reasons in the subsequent section I attempt to provide relevant information concerning the translators in question as well as their broadly understood background. Thirdly, based on common sense, one may also expect that the translators' aim and effort is to modernise and adjust their renditions of the original work to contemporary target audiences, to the reality of their own times. However, in the light of the recent research on retranslation, caution should be exercised as to possible reasons for creating subsequent translations of any text, including the Lewis's text. On the one hand,

common sense explanations for retranslating tend to focus on the ageing and alleged outdated features of the previous translation, [but on the other] [...] [t]here are multiple causes for retranslating, revising, reprinting and other kinds of recycling texts, and any case study is therefore likely to reveal a web of multiple causation. It is thus not surprising that two recent contributions attempting to grasp the phenomenon beyond individual cases use the adjective ‘rhizomatic’ with respect to the manifold influences behind retranslations (Brownlie 2006: 155; Brisset 2004: 48, as cited in Paloposki/Koskinen 2010: 296–297).

Thus, the two Finnish researchers conclude that retranslation is a complex phenomenon evading classifications and research needs to go beyond isolated case studies, but they also emphasise that “researching retranslation can also open new perspectives to a number of central issues in Translation Studies, ranging from the ethical to the aesthetic” (Paloposki/Koskinen 2010: 297). Their last remark provides another cogent reason for concentrating on the translators themselves, on such a theoretical issue as who they are (or were), who professionally translates such literature as Lewis's, and how it affects the final product within numerous aspects considered between the ethical and the aesthetic (as mentioned earlier). The above perspective also appears to draw from and be corroborated by the more historical one represented by Antoine Berman, who argues that

the twentieth century has seen the manifestation of the problematic of translation (together with that of language and languages) from different perspectives. Above all, we must mention the question of the *re-translation* of works fundamental to our Western culture: primarily the Bible, but also Greek poetry and

philosophy, Latin poetry, and the great texts that presided *over* the birth of modern literature. [...] To be sure, any translation is bound to age, and it is the destiny of all translations of the “classics” of universal literature to be retranslated sooner or later (Berman 1992: 176; original emphasis).

Obviously, Berman focuses mainly on ancient classics, but in the context of the ever-accelerating world of ideas and views, the classic and historical “flavour” of certain works as well as the more rapid ageing of their translations may indeed be the case. My argument is that the Lewis’s literature which, from the present perspective, may already be dubbed as “classical” in many respects is a case in point here. In more precise terms, Berman posits two major explanations of the phenomenon of retranslation, namely “the Progress Argument” and “the Updating Argument”. According to the first one, retranslation is a process occurring in time to restore the deficiencies in first translation(s), the main premise being that first translations are to be domesticating (target-oriented) whereas subsequent translations are to be foreignising (source-oriented). Such a new interpretation of the foreign work is possible if there is a distance between first translations and retranslations. According to the second one (“the Updating Argument”), retranslations emerge to update first translations as they become outdated with the passage of time (Yasin 2019: 147–150). What underlies the latter argument is that

[I]anguage is not a static phenomenon. It changes over time. Translations produced in a particular time and place may later become unsuitable for the new generation who seeks either a revision of first translation(s) or a new one. This argument has been used to justify retranslation (Vanderschelden, *ibid*: 4–5). Accordingly, “it is often assumed that translations age more than the STs [source texts] and that it is normal to retranslate a classic for each generation, that is every twenty or thirty years” (*ibid*) (Yasin 2019: 150; italics original).

As can be seen in the next section, the gap between Polish and Spanish first translations and retranslations of the Lewis’s book is fifteen and twelve years respectively, but, as has been mentioned above, we may make allowances for the more intense and quicker pace of the development of ideas and (world) views, so this element may be viably incorporated into the methodological framework of the present study.

Fourthly, since I inevitably make an attempt to assess to some extent the translators’ work in relation to the Lewis’s original, it is impossible not to have recourse to Juliane House’s four-tiered Functional-Pragmatic Model of Translation Evaluation, which takes into account individual text function (including ideational and interpersonal components), register (with the Hallidayan-based notions of field, tenor, and mode), genre, and language/text (House 2001). The aforementioned “tools” stem from House’s idea of translation, which is crucially

[...] related to the preservation of “meaning” across two different languages and cultures. Three aspects of that “meaning” are particularly important for translation: a semantic, a pragmatic and a textual aspect, and translation is viewed as the recontextualization of a text in L1 by a semantically and pragmatically equivalent text in L2 (House 2001: 247).

The model is schematically presented in Figure 1.




Figure 1: The model of assessing translation quality according to House (2001: 249)

Another methodological point is that the approach adopted in this study is comparative and descriptive, with “[t]he assumption underlying such comparison [being] that the relationship between any two (or more) texts may be considered a complex network of similarities and differences, which lends itself to description” (Koster 2011: 21). The ensuing citation illustrates the nature of the mini-corpus included in this study:

In the case of retranslations, it would also be possible to compile a corpus of parallel translations of a single source text to be compared among each other; parallel corpora might include translations from one target language or more languages (Koster 2011: 22).

Finally, the specific research tool I selected for the present analysis is the classification of translation techniques by Molina and Hurtado Albir (2002), which means that, unless stated otherwise, the terminology employed is taken from the article authored by these researchers. They synthesise and order the work of other translation studies experts in the way that, in my view, serves the purposes of this work.

Table 1: Classification of translation techniques (Molina/Hurtado Albir 2002: 511)

Adaptation	Baseball (E) → Fútbol (Sp)		
Amplification	Ramadan, the Muslim month of → (A) شهر رَمَضَانَ fasting (E)		
Borrowing	Pure: Lobby (E) → Lobby (Sp) Naturalized: Meeting (E) → Mitin (Sp)		
Calque	École normale (F) → Normal School (E)		
Compensation	I was seeking, Flathead (E) → en vérité, c'est bien <u>toi</u> thee	I	que je cherche, O Tête-Plate (F)
Description	Panettone (I) → The traditional Italian cake eaten on New Year's Eve (E)		
Discursive creation	Rumble fish (E) → La ley de la calle (Sp)		
Established equivalent	They are as like as two peas (E) → Se parecen como dos gotas de agua (Sp)		
Generalization	Guichet, fenêtre, devanture (F) fi Window (E)		
Linguistic amplification	No way (E) → de ninguna de las maneras (Sp)		
Linguistic compression	Yes, so what? (E) → ¿Y? (Sp)		
Literal translation	She is reading (E) → Ella está leyendo (Sp)		
Modulation	استصبح أباً (A) → You are going to have a child (Sp)		
Particularization	Window (E) → Guichet, fenêtre, devanture (F)		
Reduction	Ramadan, the Muslim month of fasting (Sp) → شهر رَمَضَانَ (A)		
Substitution (linguistic, paralinguistic)	Put your hand on your heart (A) → Thank you (E)		
Transposition	He will soon be back (E) → No tardará en venir (Sp)		
Variation	Introduction or change of dialectal indicators, changes of tone, etc.		

In sum, this methodology aims to eclectically embrace and reconcile various stances that, in my view, may complement each other, especially Berman's arguments on retranslation with subsequently formulated "the agency of translation and the socio-cultural [...] settings of retranslation" (Yasin 2019: 151) and House's (2001) views on translation quality assessment.

3. Contextualising “official” translators and analysing their work in the light of House’s and Berman’s theories

In line with the aforementioned methodological aspects it may be assumed that the comparative juxtaposition of three languages (in the case of this work: English, Polish, and Spanish) implies the presence of differing backgrounds, of various ‘mini-cultures’ (communities/societies) that these languages are steeped in. The author of the original version (C. S. Lewis) and the four translators are, in a way, representatives of four socio-geographical and cultural backgrounds: Anglo-Saxon, Polish, Peninsular Spanish, and Latin American (Spanish). The first Polish translation of *The Problem of Pain* by Tadeusz Szafrński appeared in 1995, and fifteen years later, in 2010, Andrzej Wojtasik created his own new translation of the book. The first “Iberian” Spanish translation of Lewis’s book was published in 1994, and the translator responsible for it was professor of philosophy José Luis del Barco Collazos. Later, in 2006, Susana Bunster Hiriart, a Chilean literary researcher and a lecturer at Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, came up with another Spanish translation of *The Problem of Pain*. Each of the four translations was completed more than fifty years after the original version (finalised in 1940).

At this point it is worthwhile to consider the author and the four translators in question through the prisms of the House’s (2001) translation assessment model. The first “situational dimension” (as House calls it) is field, and in the case of Lewis’s work it points to theology, philosophy, and the broadly understood notion of pain (subject matter or topic). Still within field, as concerns “degrees of generality, specificity or “granularity” in lexical items” (House 2001: 248), the Lewis’s text emerges as the one containing a combination of specialised, general, and popular vocabulary (as the sample texts discussed in the present analysis reveal). The second element is tenor, embracing

[...] the text producer’s temporal, geographical and social provenance as well as his intellectual, emotional or affective stance (his “personal viewpoint”) vis a vis the content she is portraying. Further, Tenor captures “social attitude,” i.e. different styles (formal, consultative and informal). (House 2001: 248)

Lewis’s “personal viewpoint” is particularly visible and spectacular, since from atheism he converted first to theism and shortly afterwards moved one step further and became a devout Christian. This famous conversion lies at the foundation of most of his writings, also the one discussed here, and it also impacts the “linguistic and textual engagement” with which he conveys his ideas to the reader – just to mention the use of original neologisation (see Table 5 here) or rich textual metaphoric scenes (see Tables 3 and 7). As to “social attitude,” within tenor, Lewis’s work manifests a mixture of formal and informal

styles (the sample texts of the present study seem to confirm this). In terms of mode, specifically the channel, the Lewis's text is written and "simple," i.e., "written to be read" (House 2001: 248). From the micro-contextual connections embodied by register it is also necessary to proceed to macro-contextual ones encompassed by genre, linked to the linguistic and cultural community in which texts are embedded. Very shortly and generally, Lewis lived in the 20th century in two university cities, Oxford and Cambridge, and was shaped by the intellectualism of these places/communities, so it is feasible to state that in his writings he represented "North European Anglo-Saxon norms" (House 2001: 253). This leads us to the last components within House's theory, the individual textual function and the overt-covert distinction as concerns the types of translation. On the basis of the qualitative, descriptive, comparative analysis conducted in this paper I dismiss the presence of covert translations

[...] psycholinguistically less complex and more deceptive than overt translation. Since true functional equivalence is aimed at, the original may be manipulated at the levels of Language/Text and Register via the use of a "cultural filter." The result may be a very real distance from the original (House 2001: 250).

Instead, I lean towards the presence of two Polish and two Spanish overt translations, since

[...] an original and its overt translation are to be equivalent at the level of Language/Text and Register as well as Genre. [...] As this type of [second-level functional] equivalence is, however, achieved though equivalence at the levels of Language/Text, Register and Genre, the original's frame and discourse world are co-activated, such that members of the target culture may "eavesdrop," as it were, i.e., be enabled to appreciate the original textual function, albeit at a distance. In overt translation, the work of the translator is important and visible. Since it is the translator's task to give target culture members access to the original text and its cultural impact on source culture members, the translator puts target culture members in a position to observe and/or judge this text "from outside" (House 2001: 250).

I argue that the comparative analysis of sample fragments of the original and their four translations reveals convergence at the level of language/text and register. As concerns macro-contextual "cultural" genre, I assert that there is a sufficient number of parallels between the Lewis's genre described above and the characteristics structuring the genres of the four translators whose work is under scrutiny here.

Bunster Hiriart's genre is shaped by the fact that she is a catholic researcher apparently combining the traditional option with the modern one. Her predecessor José Luis del Barco Collazos also seems to reconcile these two

perspectives to some extent, being a Malaga-based professor interested in moral philosophy, cultural history, and history of religion. Tadeusz Szafrński (1931–2014), the first translator of Lewis's *The Problem of Pain* into Polish, rendered many other religion-oriented books into that language, being himself the author of the lexicon *Historia Kościoła w Polsce* [History of the Church in Poland] published in 2005. Finally, an apparently more avantgarde, “modern”, freelance translator from a younger generation, Andrzej Wojtasik, was born in 1970 in Szczecin (Poland) but lived in London, Kraków, Kathmandu, and Los Angeles. He wanted to study art, but had a fling with chemical engineering, protective-educational pedagogy, English philology, and cultural studies (none of these fields of study he completed). Somewhat anecdotally, we also learn that in his free time he creates cuddly toys. The element connecting all these genres is intellectuality and culture-oriented pursuits as well as religion- or faith-related interest (possibly with the exception of the youngest Polish translator).

When positioning the translators' work within Berman's retranslation hypothesis, I would see the excerpts of the presented translations as the products of the translators' minds embedded in their own times, with respective retranslations having a potential for change–modifications, refinement, and “improvement”/“progress” necessitated by the passage of time. Alongside, the translators may be the product of the four socio-geographical and cultural backgrounds I have named above. Thus, taking into account different criteria, some of them may emerge as the outcome of more traditional, orthodox, devout, “truly Christian” provenience/upbringing, whereas the others as the product of a more modern, balanced, objective, and ‘science-oriented’ approach.

Last but not least, one should not ignore the fact that there has been a great leap in terms of translation technology between 1990s and the early decades of the 21st century. We should note that written translation technology has evolved from manual processes and basic aids to sophisticated systems, like Computer-Assisted Translation (CAT) Tools or Machine Translation (MT), that are meant to expedite the translation process, improve quality, and enable effective collaboration across languages and cultures. The natural and logical corollary of this fact should be that contemporary 21st century retranslations are more apt and “better” in many ways than 20th century first translations. This evaluative assumption is also in line with Berman's hypotheses on retranslation, according to which

[...] first translations are not ‘true’ or ‘good’ translations because they serve to introduce the foreign work at the expense of the peculiarities of the foreign text [...] [and thus] retranslation constitutes a progress, an accomplishment. This accomplishment is made possible because of the increasing awareness of the defects and assimilated aspects of a first translation which become clear through translation criticism as well as through the process of retranslating itself (Yasin 2019: 148–149).

Following *in extenso* this line of reasoning presented by Berman, one may form a hypothesis that the first Polish and Spanish translations of the Lewis's work by respectively Barco Collazos and Szafranski should emerge as more domesticating ones, whereas their retranslations accomplished by Bunster Hiriart (Spanish) and Wojtasik (Polish) should lean towards the foreignisation. However, what constitutes a potential confounding factor is the traditional versus modern character of the four translations in question, which are produced by four different translators representing a mixture of various socio-cultural elements, including their upbringing and worldview. The interplay of all these facets should come to the fore in the ensuing analysis.

4. *The Problem of Pain* – comparative analysis of selected excerpts

The analysis of particular fragments from *The Problem of Pain* is presented under each of eight numbered tables, where I juxtapose a given original excerpt (from C. S Lewis, henceforth CL) with its two Spanish official translations (by Barco Collazos and Bunster Hiriart, henceforth BC and BH) as well as with its two Polish official translations (by Szafranski and Wojtasik, henceforth TS and AW). All of them are introduced in the chronological order, from the earliest (the original) through the first translations, till the most recent retranslations within the Spanish and Polish set. The portions of the analysed fragments are incorporated into the tables *in italics*, together with the non-italicised text serving as a broader context.

Table 2: Chapter I, Introduction (excerpt 1)

CL: The race is doomed. Every race that comes into being in any part of the universe is doomed; for *the universe, they tell us, is running down*, and will sometime be a *uniform infinity of homogeneous matter at a low temperature*. All stories will come to nothing: all life will turn out in the end to have been a transitory and senseless contortion upon *the idiotic face of infinite matter*...

If any message from the core of reality ever were to reach us, we should expect to find in it just that unexpectedness, that wilful, dramatic *anfractuosity* which we find in the Christian faith. It has the master touch—the rough, male taste of reality, not made by us, or, indeed, for us, but hitting us in the face. If, on such grounds, or on better ones, we follow the course on which humanity has been led, and become Christians, we then have the 'problem' of pain.

BC: Las diferentes razas surgidas en el universo, da igual dónde, están destinadas a extinguirse. *Según se dice, el cosmos declina*. Llegará un momento, pues, en que sea una *inmensidad uniforme de materia homogénea, a baja temperatura*. Entonces terminará la historia, y la vida no habrá sido, a la postre, sino una efímera mueca sin sentido en el *neccio rostro de la materia infinita*.

<p>Si alguna vez llegara a nosotros algún mensaje desde el corazón de la realidad, deberíamos encontrar en él la sorpresa, la dramática e intencionada <i>anfractuosidad</i> que descubrimos en la fe cristiana.</p>
<p>BH: Toda raza que nace a la vida, en cualquier lugar del universo, está condenada: ya que, <i>según se dice, el universo se está debilitando</i> y será algún día un infinito uniforme de <i>materia homogénea a baja temperatura</i>. Todo terminará en nada: al final toda vida resultará haber sido una mueca transitoria y sin sentido de la faz necia de la materia infinita.</p> <p>Si alguna vez recibiéramos un mensaje desde el corazón de la realidad, deberíamos esperar encontrar en él, el mismo imprevisto, la misma <i>sinuosidad</i> voluntariosa y dramática que encontramos en la fe cristiana.</p>
<p>TS: Każda rasa, która pojawia się w jakiejś części wszechświata, skazana jest na zagładę; <i>wszechświat bowiem, jak słyszymy, kończy się</i> i kiedyś stanie się jednolitą nieskończonością <i>jednorodnej materii o niskiej temperaturze</i>. Wszystkie dzieje skończą się na niczym; okaże się, że wszelkie życie było przemijającym i bezsensownym zniekształceniem <i>bezmyślnego oblicza</i> nieskończonej materii.</p> <p>Jeżeli miałoby do nas dotrzeć jakiegokolwiek przesłanie z samego jądra rzeczywistości, to powinniśmy nieć nadzieję na odnalezienie w nim owej nieoczekiwanej, upartej i dramatycznej <i>zawilności</i>, jaką spotykamy w wierze chrześcijańskiej.</p>
<p>AW: Rasa ludzka skazana jest na zagładę, podobnie jak każda rasa, która kiedykolwiek pojawiła lub pojawi się w jakiegokolwiek części wszechświata. <i>Naukowcy twierdzą</i> <i>wszak, że wszechświat ekspanduje w nieskończoność i stygnie</i>, a za jakiś czas cała jego materia ulegnie rozproszeniu. Historia nie prowadzi do niczego: wszelkie życie okaże się ostatecznie przemijającym i absurdalnym grymasem na <i>idiotycznej twarzy</i> nieskończonej materii.</p> <p>Jeśli kiedykolwiek miało do nas dotrzeć jakiegokolwiek przesłanie z rdzenia rzeczywistości, powinniśmy oczekiwać, że znajdziemy w nim jedynie ową raptowną zmienność, celowa, dramatyczną „<i>zygzakowatość</i>” cechującą chrześcijańską wiarę.</p>

In Table 2 the specific content/idea formulated by CL is accompanied by introductory and metadiscoursal “they tell us”, a formulation that in the original version points to some group of people who are not explicitly characterised. Still, there is even further (conceptual) reduction in two identical and conventionalised Spanish translations by BC and BH—in “*según se dice*” [according to what is said, apparently, reportedly] the translators “give up” on the otherwise vague agent/agency present in the original, which is “they”. This makes the discourse more formal(ised), as removing the agency (the doer) and concentrating on the activity/process/procedure itself (the doing) is one of the crucial traits of (written) academic discourse, which strives to concentrate on the results of research and convey them in an impersonal, objective, unbiased manner (see, for instance, Hyland 2005 on impersonal stance and objectivity in

academic meta-discourse). Similarly, TS also removes the agent by employing “jak słyszymy” [as we hear], concentrating on what reaches the recipients of the message when they “hear it”. This wording, however, even though impersonal in the sense of lack of “the doer”, is not formal; in terms of register, it is rather at best neutral, if not informal. Conversely, AW comes up with “naukowcy twierdzą wszak, że” [scientists/researchers claim after all that], which is an example of explicitation, something that makes the agent/sender of the message more explicit to the Polish target audience – it is specifically pinpointed and labelled.

The CLs thought which is profiled by the above metadiscoursal comment is that “the universe is running down”, which quite explicitly expresses the idea of it gradually ceasing to operate or coming to an end. As neither Spanish nor Polish have an exact morphological equivalent of the original phrasal verb “to run down” BC, BH, and TS resort to the technique of established equivalent, in the sense of employing entrenched collocations that have become fixed and/or idiomatic in a given language (see Table 1 here and the juxtaposition of the English and Spanish idiomatic expressions as an illustration of established equivalent). Thus, we have more metaphorical “el cosmos declina” (BC) [the cosmos declines] and “el universo se está debilitando” (BH) [the universe is weakening], as well as the more blunt, literal version of TS “wszechświat kończy się” [the universe ends/is ending]. Again, AW rather consistently makes use of creative mixture of amplification and borrowing, employing Polish scientific verb “ekspandować” [to expand=to increase in volume or size], which he merges with the next fragment of the text: “wszechświat ekspanduje w nieskończoność i stygnie” [the universe is expanding into infinity and is cooling off]. In the original the thread of the universe running down and then the thread of it becoming matter at a low temperature are presented in terms of cause and effect, whereas in AW’s rendition these two threads seem to amalgamate into one gradual phenomenon. Additionally, the construal created by AW is not only more scholarly, but also euphemistic – it is not so definitive as in the case of CLs universe ending, but it rather points to the universe evolving into a different stage.

“The idiotic face of infinite matter” and its renditions into Spanish and Polish may be analysed in terms of euphemisation vs. dysphemisation and formality vs. informality. The English adjective “idiotic” strongly gravitates towards the dysphemistic pole and English “face” is a neutral popular noun. Both BC and BH choose the Latin-originated adjective “necio”, whose strength in Spanish is rather complicated and mostly contextual, as it may be employed informally (meaning “dumb”, “silly”) and formally, reading more literary, “highbrow”, or even archaic. This means that “necio” may be both milder (euphemistic) or harsher (dysphemistic). As for the rendition of “face”, BC opts for “el rostro”, whereas BH for “la faz”. Both of them function in Spanish in rather formal,

literary, and metaphorical settings, the latter becoming more and more rare. TS uses “bezmyślny” [mindless, senseless], which in Polish is more euphemistic, whereas AW adheres to the original dysphemistic value by employing the exact Polish equivalent “idiotyczny” [idiotic]. The Polish rendition of CL’s “face” by TS is formal and even somewhat archaic, since he uses “oblicze” [visage, countenance], while AW employs neutral, natural, and popular “twarz” [face].

In the same excerpt CL metaphorically characterises the Christian faith by referring to its “anfractuosity”. Michael Quinion (2009) on his World Wide Words website elaborates on the sense of this word, stating that “the term is used in modern times to refer to a kind of opaque and circuitous legal prose, full of twists and turns, seemingly designed more to confuse than to clarify.”¹ He also adds that the word comes from Latin *anfractus*, a bending around, and from the verb *frangere*, to break, and he illustrates the point by mentioning the very fragment from CL. Thus, the original construal of anfractuosity is based on changing the shape of some object and finally breaking it, from which the metaphorical reading emerges. BC safely employs the borrowing “anfractuosity”, adjusting the original to the morphology of the Spanish language, whereas BH opts for “sinuosidad”, which may be treated as an example of particularisation, since what is highlighted is the metaphorical construal of convolutedness and thus complicatedness. In the same vein, TS and AW choose respectively such particularisations as “zawiłość” [twistedness] and “zygzakowatość” [zigzaggedness], both of them evoking visual construals of shapes, or specifically moving along a path in a specific manner reminding of a given shape.

Table 3: Chapter IV, Human Wickedness (excerpt 2)

CL: At such a moment we really do know that our character, as revealed in this action, is, and ought to be, hateful to all good men, and, if there are powers above man, to them. A God who did not regard this with unappeasable distaste would not be a good being. We cannot even wish for such a God—*it is like wishing that every nose in the universe were abolished*, that smell of hay or roses or the sea should never again delight any creature, because our own breath happens to stink.

BC: Un dios así no podría ser deseado por nosotros. Hacerlo sería *como desear que desapareciera del universo el sentido del olfato*, que el aroma del humo², de las rosas o del mar no deleitara nunca más a las criaturas por el hecho de que nuestro aliento huele mal.

1| <https://www.worldwidewords.org>, accessed: 6.02.2023.

2| BC makes a strange choice of “humo” [smoke], instead of more obvious Spanish equivalent of “hay”, which is “heno” (as BH did), which may be, in fact, his oversight, due to orthographic resemblance of these Spanish words.

BH: Ni siquiera podemos desear un Dios así; es como *desear que se suprima cada nariz que existe en el universo*; que el aroma del heno, de las rosas, o del mar jamás volviera a deleitar a creatura alguna, porque resulta que nuestro propio aliento apesta.

TS: Nie możemy nawet pragnąć takiego Boga – to tak, jakbyśmy chcieli zlikwidować wszystkie nosy na świecie, by zapach siana, róż lub morza nigdy nie zachwycał żadnego człowieka, dlatego że nam cuchnie z ust.

AW: Nie możemy nawet pragnąć, aby istniał Bóg wybaczący takie czyny – to jakby pragnąć, aby wszystkie istoty straciły powonienie, aby nikogo nie cieszył już zapach siana, róż, lub morza, bo tak się złożyło, że nasz oddech cuchnie.

Table 3 concentrates on translations of a vivid hypothetical comparison that CL uses to illustrate one of his ideas, namely that “every nose in the universe were abolished”. What seems to be present in the case of TS’s rendition is the change of perspective – the change of agent that can be observed in moving from an impersonal structure (present in the original) to a personal, plural(ised), and yet still formal, objective, inclusive pronoun “my” [we]: “jakbyśmy chcieli zlikwidować wszystkie nosy na” [as if we wanted to abolish all noses in the world]. In the light of the synthetic classification of translation techniques proposed by Molina and Hurtado Albir (2002: 510), this emerges as a structural modulation, since TS seems to have shifted the point of view and focus by introducing a syntactic structure different in relation to the source text. However, this move on the part of the Polish translator does not make the target version more formal; in fact, a rather colloquial “flavour” of the original is still preserved, as TS adheres literally to the idea of “all noses being abolished”. In the same vein, BH proposes literal translation, namely “desear que se suprima cada nariz que existe en el universo” [wish that every nose in the universe be abolished/eliminated] and preserves the informal character of the original as well. Conversely, both AW and BC opt for more formal explicitation (and possibly modulation?): “pragnąć, aby wszystkie istoty straciły powonienie” [wish that all creatures lost the sense of smell] and “desear que desapareciera del universo el sentido del olfato” [wish that the sense of smell/olfaction would disappear from the universe] respectively. It seems to be debatable here whether such a switch from source text informality to target text formal explicitation contributes anything in terms of aptness of translation and thus whether it is felicitous or not. The above examples and their analysis also reveal that in practice it is frequently difficult to ascribe one specific translation technique to a given solution chosen by translators (hence my doubts whether some of the formulations highlighted above are just cases of explicitation or their mixture with modulation).

Table 4: Chapter V, The Fall of Man (excerpt 3)

CL: Thus the organs, no longer governed by man's will, fell under the control of ordinary biochemical laws and suffered <i>whatever the inter-workings of those laws might bring about in the way of pain, senility and death</i>
BC: de ese modo, los órganos, no gobernados ya por la voluntad del hombre, quedaron sometidos al gobierno de las leyes bioquímicas generales, y sufrieron las <i>consecuencias de la interacción</i> de unas con otras, como el dolor, la senilidad y la muerte.
BH: Es así como los órganos, ya no gobernados por la voluntad del hombre, cayeron bajo el control de leyes bioquímicas corrientes, y sufrieron <i>todo lo que el interfuncionamiento</i> de aquellas leyes pueda traer consigo a manera de dolor, senectud y muerte.
TS: Tak więc organy człowieka, nie rządzone już jego wolą, podpadają pod kontrolę zwykłych praw biochemicznych i cierpią wszystko, co <i>działanie owych praw może przynieść</i> w postaci bólu, starości lub śmierci.
AW: Narządy, którymi nie zarządzała już ludzka wola znalazły się pod kontrolą zwykłych biochemicznych praw i podlegały konsekwencjom tych praw, doświadczając cierpienia związanych z bólem, starością i śmiercią.

Table 4 focuses on the choices made while translating an apparently “innocuous” English compound, namely “inter-workings”. Indeed, its rendition does not seem to be problematic for professional Polish and Spanish translators. The latter employ a given established equivalent – BC opts for “la interacción” [interaction] BH uses “el interfuncionamiento” [interfunctioning]. The former resort to linguistic compression and generalisation (TS suggests “działanie” [functioning, work]) and amplification (AW employs “podlegały konsekwencjom” [were subjected to consequences]). Quite obviously, such choices on the part of Spanish and Polish translators are due to the nature of the languages they represent, since Spanish exhibits certain morphological affinity with English (in terms of creating compounds), whereas Polish and English seem to be more distant in this respect, though, of course, all of them belong to the same Indo-European family. Perhaps less obviously, the formal/scientific character of the original is preserved, irrespective of translation techniques selected by each of the four translators.

Table 5: Chapter V, The Fall of Man (excerpt 4)

CL: That we can die ‘in’ Adam and live ‘in’ Christ seems to me to imply that man, as he really is, differs a good deal from man as our categories of thought and our three-dimensional imaginations represent him; that the separateness—modified only by causal relations— which we discern between individuals, is balanced, in absolute reality, by some kind of ‘ <i>inter-inanimation</i> ’ of which we have no conception at all [...]. We believe that the Holy Spirit can be really present and operative in the human spirit, but we do not, like Pantheists, take this to mean that we are ‘parts’ or ‘modifications’ or ‘ <i>appearances</i> ’ of God.

BC: [...] que la separación percibida entre individuos, –modificada solamente por relaciones causales– está equilibrada en la realidad absoluta por algún tipo de «*animación recíproca*» de la que no tenemos idea alguna. [...] Creemos que el Espíritu Santo puede estar realmente presente y obrando de forma eficaz en el espíritu humano, pero no consideramos, como hacen los panteístas, que Su acción en nosotros nos convierta en «partes», «modificaciones» o «*cualidades*» de Dios.

BH: [...] que la separatividad –modificada solamente por relaciones causales– que distinguimos entre individuos, es balanceada, en la realidad, por cierto tipo de «*inter-desánimo*» del cual no poseemos concepto alguno. [...] Creemos que el Espíritu Santo puede estar realmente presente, y en forma operativa, en el espíritu humano, pero no creemos –como los panteístas– que esto signifique que somos «partes», o «modificaciones», o «*apariencias*» de Dios.

TS: [...] że odrębność – modyfikowana jedynie przypadkowymi kontaktami – którą dostrzegamy pomiędzy poszczególnymi ludźmi, zrównoważona jest w rzeczywistości absolutnej czymś w rodzaju „*międzyzależności*” (*interinanimation*), o której nie mamy żadnego pojęcia. [...] Wierzymy, że Duch Święty może być rzeczywiście obecny i działać w ludzkim duchu, ale nie uważamy, jak panteiści, by miało to oznaczać, iż jesteśmy „częściczkami”, „modyfikacjami” lub „*pozorami*” Boga.

AW: [...] że odrębność poszczególnych jednostek, modyfikowana tylko przez związki przyczynowe między nimi, w absolutnej rzeczywistości jest równoważona przez jakiś rodzaj „*między-bezruchu*”, o którym nie mamy w ogóle pojęcia. [...] Wierzymy, że Duch Święty może być naprawdę obecny i działać w ludzkim duchu, lecz w odróżnieniu od panteistów nie uważamy, że musi to oznaczać, iż jesteśmy „częściami”, „modyfikacjami” czy „*przejawieniami*” Boga.

The prefix “inter-” is the crucial element of CLs neologism “inter-inanimation”, which poses a real challenge for translators. Intriguingly, it is the stem “inanimation” that turns out to be problematic in translation. Morphologically, it can be further broken into “in-” (a prefix), “anima” (a root), and “-tion” (a suffix). The Latin root “anima” means life/breath, and in modern English is widely associated with various aspects of literal or metaphorical movement. The prefix “in-” added to this root may have two opposite senses, a confusion going back to Late Latin³. Thus, “inanimation” in English may have two meanings, namely “lack of animation” or “infusion of life or vigour, animation, inspiration”, the latter illustrated by the citation from bishop Joseph Hall: “The inanimation of Christ living and breathing within us”⁴. This may be the reason for which the three translators seem to choose inappropriately the former meaning of “inanimation”, not

3] https://www.etymonline.com/word/in-#etymonline_v_6285, accessed: 21.03.2023.

4] <https://www.thefreedictionary.com/Inanimation>, accessed: 21.03.2023. Also, Etymonline (n.d.), in the entry elaborating on the origin and complexities of the prefix “in”, provides us with the information that “Inanimate (adj.) is “lifeless,” but Donne uses

correlating with what apparently transpires from CL's text (the interpretation that more probably than not converges with the "vigorous" and inspirational sense expressed by bishop Hall above). Thus, both Polish translators struggle with the original neologism "inter-inanimation", which only reveals the problematic nature of this lexical unit – it appears that neither "międzyzależność" (TS⁵) [inter-dependence] nor "między-bezruch" (AW) [inter-stillness] are fully adequate, though, rather predictably, both TS and AW employ adequately the prefix "między-" [between] as an equivalent of English "inter-". In the case of Spanish translators, we can expect that they may resort to some kind of 'morphological affinity' between Spanish and English. Indeed, BH employed morphologically similar "inter-desánimo" [inter-discouragement], which emerges as a somewhat surprising misconstrual of CL's idea, but BC suggests a successful and precise rendition of "inter-inanimation" as "animación recíproca" [reciprocal animation], which, again, adequately encapsulates the meaning of the English prefix "inter-". On the whole, all professional translators but one (BC) seem to be not fully precise and successful while translating the term "inter-inanimation". On the other hand, caution should be exercised while evaluating whether translators really commit a translation error or not. However, if we resort to Hejwowski's classification of translation errors, we may be tempted to assume that TS and AW choose the most common "dictionary equivalent" which does not have to be the right solution, whereas BH falls into the trap of "false friends", all of them being example of syntagmatic errors (Hejwowski 2004: 203–204). Or perhaps one could even go so far as to argue that TS, AW, and BH simply commit "misinterpretation errors", resulting from erroneous interpretations on the part of the translator and "most commonly [...] stem[ming] from insufficient knowledge of the source language, and above all – source culture" (Hejwowski 2004: 210). This may well be the case, but in the light of the background information about the translators in question presented earlier in this work, it appears to be highly improbable here. Hejwowski (2004) also adds that an error can stem not only from linguistic factors but also from cultural and intentional factors, meaning that translation errors are not always negative – they can result from conscious translator choices that contribute to shaping the perception of the translation. Finally, he makes the distinction between errors and discrepancies, the latter being differences between the source text and the translation that arise from translator choices so they may not necessarily be considered

inanimate (v.) to mean "infuse with life or vigor." https://www.etymonline.com/word/in-#etymonline_v_6285, accessed: 21.03.2023.

5] Additionally, earlier in this fragment, TS mistranslates "causal relations" as "przypadkowe kontakty" [casual contacts], which in all probability results from the translator's oversight, falling victim to the orthographic resemblance between English words "caUS-al" and "caSUal".

errors. Regardless of the above doubts, it seems that all translations preserve the original formal register, ostensibly due to the novel and neologistic nature of the words consisting of the prefixes “inter-” and “między”, followed by a given root in Spanish and Polish respectively.

Another translationally challenging fragment presented in Table 5 is “‘appearances’ of God”. CL puts the word “appearances” in converted commas, which may suggest to the reader that he qualifies the meaning of this word in a way that it should fit whatever are his “theological purposes”. This may in turn somehow alert translators both in a positive and negative sense, as they may also start to overthink and become suspicious about the rendition of “appearances”. Spanish offers a safe solution to this potential translatory problem, as there exists a precise equivalent of “appearance” in that language, equally polysemous as in English, namely “apariencia”. This is probably why BH resorts to interpretatively spacious “‘apariencias’ de Dios”. In this case the translator is exempt from adjudicating the sense of “appearances” and leaves the interpretation to the target reader. In turn, BC opts for riskier “«cualidades» de Dios” [qualities of God], narrowing down the scope of the word to somewhat imprecise “qualities”, which may, perhaps, be also “read” in Spanish as attributes or virtues. TS seems to have mistranslated “appearances” as “pozory” [what appears to be, but does not really exist], whereas AW comes up with “przejawy” [manifestations], which is precise in the context of the theological reasoning presented by CL. Again, in the light of Hejwowski’s considerations on translational discrepancies and errors, one may only speculate about factors that prompted all the afore-mentioned translators to make the choices they made and whether some of them are really to be classified as errors as such or not.

Table 6: Chapter V, The Fall of Man (excerpt 5)

CL: The world is a dance in which good, descending from God, is disturbed by evil arising from the creatures, and the resulting conflict is resolved by <i>God’s own assumption of the suffering nature which evil produces. The doctrine of the free Fall</i> asserts that the evil which thus makes the fuel or raw material for the second and more complex kind of good is not God’s contribution but man’s [...].
BC: el conflicto entre ambos es resuelto por <i>la decisión divina de asumir la naturaleza doliente, que es la causa del mal. La doctrina de la caída, un acto libre del hombre</i> , afirma que el mal (que hace de combustible o materia prima de un segundo y más complejo género de bien) no es obra de Dios, sino del hombre.
BH: [...] y el conflicto resultante es resuelto por <i>la propia toma por parte de Dios, de la naturaleza doliente producida por el pecado. La doctrina de la libre caída</i> sostiene, que el mal, que es de este modo el combustible o la materia prima para el segundo y más complejo tipo de bien, no es contribución de Dios sino del hombre.

TS: [...] a konflikt, jaki z tego wynika, zostaje rozwiązany dzięki przyjęciu przez Boga cierpiącej natury wytwarzającej zło. Doktryna o dobrowolnym upadku człowieka twierdzi, że zło, które w wyniku tego stało się paliwem czy surowcem dla drugiego, bardziej skomplikowanego rodzaju dobra, nie jest dziełem Boga, lecz człowieka.

AW: [...] a wynikiły konflikt Bóg rozwiązuje poprzez wniebowzięcie cierpiącej natury, która wytwarza zło. Zgodnie z nauką o swobodnym charakterze Upadku zło stanowiące paliwo lub surowiec dla drugiego i bardziej złożonego rodzaju dobra, nie jest wkładem Boga, lecz człowieka.

Table 6 highlights translational deficiencies present in the Polish and Spanish translations due to a source-language lexico-syntactic “unit” which causes the translators to misconstrue its message. Thus, “God’s own assumption of the suffering nature which evil produces” emerges as both a lexically and syntactically challenging fragment for some translators. The only professional translator who aptly captures the message of this excerpt is BH, as she appropriately “reads” the causality of this context, and her rendition is “la propia toma por parte de Dios, de la naturaleza doliente producida por el pecado” [God’s own decision to take the suffering nature produced by sin]. It is the evil that produces the suffering nature, not the other way around. Additionally, BH employs the technique of particularisation by replacing more general “evil” with theologically relevant “pecado” [sin], which also constitutes a certain case of “progress”, a gloss meant for the target audience (in the light of Berman’s understanding of the nature of retranslations). In turn, BC suggests “la decisión divina de asumir la naturaleza doliente, que es la causa del mal” [the divine decision to assume/take the suffering nature, which is the cause of evil], wrongly reversing the order of cause and effect (*the suffering is the cause and evil is the effect). The same mistranslation occurs in the Polish versions of TS and AW: “cierpiącej natury wytwarzającej zło” [the suffering nature producing evil] and “cierpiącej natury, która wytwarza zło” [the suffering nature which produces evil] respectively. Additionally, and somehow surprisingly, AW mistranslates “the resulting conflict is resolved by God’s own assumption of the suffering nature” as “a wynikiły konflikt Bóg rozwiązuje poprzez wniebowzięcie cierpiącej natury” [and the resulting conflict God solves by taking the suffering nature to heaven], which appears as an example of overtheologising on the part of the translator, who, for some reason, shies away from the more neutral and widespread meaning of “assumption” as acceptance/taking on and apparently is misguided by the Assumption (of the Virgin Mary). So, again, the potential translation error here is not successfully capturing the cause-and-effect nexus between the suffering nature and evil by three of the afore-mentioned translators.

“The doctrine of the free Fall” also constitutes a potential conundrum for translators. One may consider here the literal and physical construal, but in the understanding of CL it is to be interpreted metaphorically as volitional, depending on humans’ free will⁶.

However, BC and BH deal with this notion intelligently in their translations, each of them resorting to a different technique. BC opts for a mixture of modulation and particularisation in “La doctrina de la caída, un acto libre del hombre” [the doctrine of the fall, a free act of a human], where the adjective “libre” [free] is moved to the particularised fragment. Conversely, BH adheres safely to literal translation: “La doctrina de la libre caída” [the doctrine of the free fall]. Unlike BC’s exegetic rendition, the one by BH leaves the interpretation to the reader, as the Spanish adjective “libre” is equally polysemous as its English equivalent “free”. The same type of polysemy applies to the Polish adjective “wolny” [free], so Polish translators could also naturally opt for weaving this word into their renditions, just to be “on the safe side”. However, this is not the case as concerns TS and AW. Each of them uses a synonym with a different effect. TS adequately comes up with “Doktryna o dobrowolnym upadku człowieka” [the doctrine of the voluntary fall of a human], also making it more explicit and particularising it by adding the human element. AW, in turn, proposes “Zgodnie z nauką o swobodnym charakterze Upadku” [according to the science of the free character of the fall], which seems to be less successful, if not inadequate, since the Polish adjective “swobodny” [free] is at best semantically too spacious (polysemous) and at worst it has distinct connotations “gravitating” towards the laws of physics. On the whole, AW’s formulation is more physical (related to physics) than theological so it does not quite correspond with the message of CL’s text.

Table 7: Chapter VI, Human Pain/Chapter VII, Human Pain-continued (excerpt 6)

CL: Thus the terrible necessity of tribulation is only too clear. God has had me for but forty-eight hours and then only by dint of taking everything else away from me. Let Him but sheathe that sword for a moment and I behave like a puppy when the hated bath is over—I shake myself as dry as I can and race off to reacquire my comfortable dirtiness, if not in the nearest manure heap, at least in the nearest flower bed. And that is why tribulations cannot cease *until God either sees us remade or sees that our remaking is now hopeless* [...].

Of all evils, pain only is sterilised or disinfected evil [...]. After an error you need not only to remove the causes (the fatigue or bad writing) but also to correct the error itself: after a sin you must not only, if possible, remove the temptation, you must also go back and repent the sin itself. *In each case an ‘undoing’ is required. Pain requires no such undoing.*

6] For further elaboration on this issue see <https://www.cslewis.com/creations-weak-point/>.

BC: Si el Señor envainara se espada un instante, me comportaría como un cachorro tras el odiado baño. Me sacudiría para secarme cuanto pudiera, y me apresuraría a recuperar mi confortable suciedad en el cercano lecho de flores, o peor aún, en el contiguo montón de estiércol. Ésa es la razón por la que la adversidad no cesará *hasta que Dios nos rehaga de nuevo o vea que carece de esperanzas seguir intentándolo*.

El dolor es, entre todos los males, el único esterilizado o aséptico [...]. *en ambos casos se requiere «deshacer» algo. el dolor no necesita deshacer nada.*

BH: Tan sólo permítasele envainar su espalda por un momento, y me comporto como un cachorro una vez terminado su odioso baño—me sacudo hasta quedar tan seco como pueda, y corro a readquirir mi cómoda mugre, si no bien en el montón de estiércol más cercano, por lo menos en el más cercano macizo de flores. y por eso es que la tribulación no puede cesar *hasta que Dios nos vea ya sea rehechos, o que el rehacernos no tiene ahora esperanza.*

De todos los males, solamente el dolor es un mal esterilizado y desinfectado [...] *en cada caso se requiere un “deshacer”.* *el dolor no requiere tal deshacer [...]* pero el dolor es estéril una vez que se acaba.

TS: Niech tylko jednak na chwilę schowa miecz do pochwy, a zaczynam się zachowywać jak szczeniak, gdy znieawidzona kąpiel wreszcie się skończy – otrząsam się z wody i pędzę, by jak najszybciej odzyskać utracony brud, jeżeli nie w najbliższym gnojowisku, to przynajmniej na grządce. Dlatego właśnie cierpienia nie mogą ustać, aż *dopóki Bóg nie zobaczy, że się zmieniliśmy albo że ta nasza zmiana jest w tej chwili niemożliwa.*

Spśród całego zła cierpienie jest tylko wysterylizowanym czy zdezynfekowanym złem [...]. *W każdym przypadku wymagane jest „odrobienie”.* *Cierpienie nie wymaga takiego odrobienia [...]* ale samo cierpienie, gdy już się zakończyło, jest sterylne.

AW: Niech tylko na chwilę schowa do pochwy swój miecz, a ja zachowam się jak szczenię, gdy znieawidzona kąpiel dobiegła końca – otrząsnę się z wody, jak tylko potrafię, i popędzę, aby ponownie zanurzyć się w coś przyjemnie brudnego, w najbliższą grządkę z kwiatami, jeśli nie w najbliższą kupę gnoju. Oto dlaczego udręki nie mogą ustać, *dopóki Bóg nie ujrzy nas stworzonymi na nowo lub dopóki nie zrozumie, że nasza odnowa jest sprawą beznadziejną.*

Ze wszelkiego zła jedynie cierpienie jest złem wysterylizowanym lub wydezynfekowanym [...]. *W każdym wypadku wymagane jest „odczynienie”.* *Cierpienie nie wymaga takiego odczynienia [...]* lecz gdy tylko się skończy, cierpienie jest jałowe.

In turn, Table 7 focuses on forms which may be challenging in translation on account of their morphological structure. These are compounds containing the repetition suffix, or specifically, prefix “re-” (Dixon 2014: 169) and the prefix which has a reversative meaning, namely “un-” (Dixon 2014: 104). In CL’s “[...] until God either sees us remade or sees that our remaking is now hopeless’ the repetition prefix “re-” features twice, forming a kind of coherent conceptual

unit (past-participle adjective “remade”, noun “remaking”). The translations of the above excerpt are to a large extent creative, both lexically and in terms of using various translation techniques. BC resorts to a mixture of transposition, amplification, and modulation, by changing a grammatical category from an adjective to a verb, adding an adverb, and changing the point of view in terms of agentivity (in the original version God is patientive and humans are agentive, in BC’s rendition God becomes the agent): “que Dios nos rehaga de nuevo” [that God remakes us anew]. In the second part of this context he employs modulation: “o vea que carece de esperanzas seguir intentándolo” [or sees that it lacks hopes to keep trying]. BH, for a change, is less creative and applies mostly literal translation, preserving the same grammatical categories and the same perspective (the masculine plural adjective “rehechos” [remade] and the noun “el rehacernos” [the remaking us]). By analogy to BC, TS employs transposition and switches from an adjective to a verb: “dopóki Bóg nie zobaczy, że się zmieniliśmy” [until God sees that we have changed], but in the second part he adheres to the same grammatical category, namely the noun “nasza zmiana” [our change]. The most stylised and archaised translation seems to be represented by AW, who makes use of archaic particularisation: “dopóki Bóg nie ujrzy nas stworzonymi na nowo” [until God beholds us created anew], and in the second part he opts for more particular “odnowa” [renewal/revival].

Translators also have to render the compound “undoing”, which CL weaves into his considerations concerning the nature of sin and of pain. The word functions in English in the entrenched conventionalised phrase “to be sb’s undoing” in the sense of failure/downfall. In CL’s context, however, the meaning of “undoing” is different, associated with “the most frequent meaning of *un-* [indicating] ‘reversal of a process’” (Dixon 2014: 105).

In this case, both Spanish translators rely on literal translation, a technique fully justified and reasonable, since Spanish has at its avail the verb “deshacer” [to undo], which can be converted into the deverbal noun “un deshacer” [undoing]. Thus, BC chooses the verb, BH opts for the noun, and both of them, in a way, do not have to concern themselves with the interpretation of the Spanish reader.

The Polish translators, however, face a challenge here as Polish in this respect does not converge with English in terms of the confluence of morphological and semantic equivalence. TS seems to ignore this fact and suggests “odrobienie” [undoing], which, apparently, is morphologically equivalent, but semantically imprecise and confusing, since it does not readily create the association of atonement for sins in the Polish recipient, but rather of accomplishing an assignment/doing one’s homework. Conversely, AW opts for rather archaic “odczyńnienie”, which in the Polish tradition means lifting a spell from someone. Even though the folk-belief connotations are strong, it appears that AW’s choice

is appropriate in the philosophical and theological context present in the original. Either way, translators are challenged to react accordingly to convey such a “finetuned” subsense of this prefixed English noun in CL’s treatise⁷.

Table 8: Chapter VIII, Hell (excerpt 7)

CL: <i>Destruction, we should naturally assume, means the unmaking, or cessation, of the destroyed. In all our experience, however, the destruction of one thing means the emergence of something else. Burn a log, and you have gases, heat and ash. To have been a log means now being those three things.</i>
BC: <i>Es natural suponer que «destrucción» significa «disolución» o «supresión» de lo destruido [...]. Haber sido tronco significa ser ahora esas tres cosas.</i>
BH: <i>Debiéramos suponer en forma natural, que destrucción significa el deshacer, o cesación, de lo destruido [...]. Haber sido un leño significa ahora ser esas tres cosas.</i>
TS: <i>Zniszczenie—można założyć w sposób naturalny—oznacza zniweczenie lub zakończenie istnienia niszczonego [...]. Bycie kłodą oznacza, że jest się teraz tymi trzema rzeczami.</i>
AW: <i>Zniszczenie, jak powinniśmy naturalnie założyć, oznacza unieważnienie lub ustanie istnienia zniszczonego stworzenia [...]. To, że coś było polanem oznacza teraz bycie tymi trzema rzeczami.</i>

By analogy to renditions of “undoing” in the previous excerpt, Table 8 presents diverse translations of “unmaking”, which CL contextualises in the eighth chapter of his work while defining “destruction of the destroyed”. “Unmaking” is, in fact, the part of the destruction-unmaking-cessation conceptual structure created by CL. As to official translations discussed here, BC opts for “disolución” [dissolution], BH chooses “deshacer” [unmaking, undoing], TS suggests “zniweczenie”

7| As to renditions of “undoing” in Polish translations, a few more cases of felicitous lexical creativity can be presented here. I asked a group of MA translation students from the University of Silesia (between years 2020–2022) to translate certain fragments from CL’s work into Polish (a study in preparation). They are mostly young people in their twenties, GenZers, who ostensibly represent the most computer-savvy generation at the beginning of the third decade of the 21st century. Thus, it should not come as a surprise that the most frequent choice among these novice student translators in this context is “cofniecie”, which in Polish may quite obviously and traditionally point to withdrawal, annulment, cancellation, turning or going back (depending on the context), but this translation may be connected with them being embedded in IT technology on a daily basis. As a result, yet another specific sense of the word may be activated (also in the contemporary Polish target audience) namely the one functioning in computing, pointing to undoing an action by pressing Ctrl+Z. In the similar vein, another word employed by these young translators connoting modern technology is “wyzerowanie” [zeroing/resetting].

[thwarting], and AW employs “unieważnienie” [invalidation, annulment, cancellation]. Each of these choices represents various techniques and degrees of directness. BC’s and AW’s options are euphemistic particularisations, BH’s choice is unproblematic literal translation (as it leaves—on the part of the translator—the interpretation to the target reception), and TS’s suggestion is an example of more direct archaicised particularisation. The remainder of the fragment concerning “unmaking” contains an appositional explicative specification of the term, succinctly defining it as “cessation”. This formal word is, again, rendered in various ways in translations ranging from literal translation (BH’s morphologically equivalent “cesación” and AW’s morphologically non-equivalent “ustanie”) through generalisation (general and neutral “zakończenie” [ending] in the case of TS) to a mixture of particularisation and modulation (BC’s “supresión” [suppression], which is more creative and changes the focus of the original construal)⁸.

Table 9: Chapter IX, Animal Pain (excerpt 8)

<p>CL: Even in the single pain, there is no self to say ‘I am in pain’—for if it could distinguish itself from the sensation—the bed from the stream—sufficiently to say ‘I am in pain’, it would also be able to connect the two sensations as its experience. [...] and the higher domestic animals, have not, in some degree, a self or soul which connects experiences and gives rise to rudimentary individuality. But at least a great deal of what appears to be animal suffering need not be suffering in any real sense. <i>It may be we who have invented the ‘sufferers’ by the ‘pathetic fallacy’ of reading into the beasts a self for which there is no real evidence.</i></p>
<p>BC: Posiblemente <i>hayamos sido nosotros los inventores del animal «doliente» mediante la «falacia patética» de atribuir a las bestias un «yo» del que no hay la menor evidencia real.</i></p>
<p>BH: Puede que <i>seamos nosotros quienes hemos inventado a los “sufrientes” mediante la “falacia patética” de ver en las bestias un yo del cual no hay evidencia alguna.</i></p>
<p>TS: Być może, <i>iż to właśnie my wymyśliliśmy „cierpiące” zwierzęta, powodowani „patetyczną iluzją” dopatrywania się w nich istnienia „ja”, na które nie ma żadnych rzeczywistych dowodów.</i></p>

8] It is worth mentioning at this point that the most famous connection between the process of unmaking in the context of pain was made by Elaine Scarry (1985) in her influential work *The Body in Pain. The Making and Unmaking of the World*, where the author highlights the making-unmaking dichotomy. The title of the Polish official translation of Scarry’s classic work created by Joanna Bednarek in 2019 is *Ból – konstruowanie i dekonstruowanie świata w obliczu cierpienia* [Pain – constructing and deconstructing the world in the face of suffering]. None of the translators whose work is analysed in this study entertained the idea of rendering unmaking in terms of deconstructing, which should not come as a surprise, given different contexts and periods in which Lewis’s and Scarry’s works were created.

AW: Być może to jedynie my wytworzyliśmy „cierpiących” poprzez „psychizację przyrody”, poprzez przypisywanie zwierzętom jaźni, na istnienie której nie ma prawdziwych dowodów.

The last excerpt from CL juxtaposed with its Polish and Spanish translations contains two notions which the author qualifies, and he does so by inserting them inside quotation marks. Such a textual and stylistic action may put some translators on guard and compel them to act accordingly in terms of making an attempt to “unearth” some special additional meaning or connotation in the word/expression at hand. In the case of CL, the first qualified “object”, namely the “sufferers”, comes into being by the application of a specific mental operation, which CL simultaneously labels and qualifies as the “pathetic fallacy” (the second qualified notion) – “we [...] have invented the “sufferers” by the ‘pathetic fallacy’ of [doing something]”. Both BH and AW do not appear to be alarmed by the original qualification of “sufferers” and apply literal translation: “los sufrientes” and “cierpiący” (a plural noun) respectively. Thus, they only stress the presence of the qualified lexical item by preserving quotation marks and do not decide to elaborate on this qualification any further. Conversely, BC and TS apply analogous instances of what appears to be particularisation and they refer to “el animal «doliente»” [the suffering, pained animal] and “‘cierpiące’ zwierzęta” [suffering animals] respectively. It is worth noting there that in each case what is qualified is only the equivalent of the original element while the added element (animal(s)) is not qualified. Various semantic shades and connotations may also be observed in the rendition of the verb “invent”. Spanish is in many respects morphologically akin to English so no wonder BH employs “quienes hemos inventado” [who have invented], whereas BC slightly changes the original construal by applying transposition, a noun instead of a verb, namely “hayamos sido nosotros los inventores del [...]” [it might be us who invented the]. TS, in turn, instead of using an unambiguous Polish equivalent “wynaleźć” [to invent] opts for more ambiguous “wymyślić”, which, apart from the sense of being an inventor, may also, to some extent negatively, connote thinking or making up something that does not exist in reality. Such a choice should not be seen as unwarranted when we look at his rendition of the original expression “pathetic fallacy” (his choice of lexis in the Polish translation may suggest a negative evaluation of the referent behind this expression), appearing later in this context (to be elaborated on shortly). AW, for a change, employs particularisation (rather neutral or even positive in terms of evaluation), which is the verb “wytworzyć” [create, manufacture], again corresponding with his neutral if not positive option for CL’s “pathetic fallacy” (see further discussion here).

It is intriguing to observe how translators act while being confronted with CL's second qualified notion, namely the "pathetic fallacy". The notion of pathetic fallacy is already well-established in the English language, having been coined by the British cultural critic John Ruskin in 1856⁹. The Spanish translators again may take advantage of the lexical and morphological correspondences holding between their mother tongue and English, and they do so quite willingly. Both BC and BH readily make us of literal "falacia patética", meaning that they do not have to adjudicate whether the concept introduced by CL has rather positive or negative connotations. Polish translators in turn seem to be more disadvantaged in this respect, since the English adjective "pathetic" is a potential false friend for Poles (its morphological cognate "patetyczny" in Polish denoting something exulted, lofty, solemn, pompous, or grandiloquent). Thus, just like in Spanish literal translation turns out to be an apt translation technique (as illustrated above), Polish renditions of "pathetic fallacy" may turn out to be more problematic, interpretatively ambiguous, or imprecise. TS chooses the formulation "patetyczna iluzja". Technically, "pathetic" versus "patetyczny" can be perceived as a calque, but each word is entrenched in English and Polish respectively, and each of them has a different sense or connotation attached to it. To Polish eyes or ears, as already mentioned, "patetyczny" may point to something at worst pompous/grandiose and at best solemn. Either way it carries a negative connotation just like modern English "pathetic", but a different one ("pathetic" denoting weak, useless, or causing pity). In connection with "iluzja" [illusion] employed by TS as an equivalent of "fallacy", the final effect is only mildly negative if not neutral, or even slightly positive – lofty illusions may emerge as somewhat palatable after all. Thus, the negative connotation behind "patetyczny" appears to be to some extent neutralised or softened and the result looks like the case of an apt collocation. In "patetyczna iluzja" [lofty illusion] a translator may conceptually depart from illusion and endow with being pathetic, which in turn leads to "iluzja" and "patetyczny" in Polish translation. This is what TS may have done provided that he adhered to the obsolete/archaic meaning of English "pathetic"¹⁰, its sense

9] For this reason, it has already made its way to numerous dictionaries. For instance, Cambridge Dictionary refers to it as the situation "(in art and literature) when animals and things are described as if they have human emotions or qualities" (<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/pl/dictionary/english-polish/pathetic-fallacy>, accessed on 27.03.2023), and Glosbe defines it as "an error in logical argumentation which consists in treating inanimate objects or concepts as if they were human beings, for instance having thoughts or feelings" (<https://pl.glosbe.com/słownik-angielsko-polski/pathetic%20fallacy>, accessed on 27.03.2023).

10] It has been rightly pointed out to me by an observant reviewer of this article that it is possible that in the expression "pathetic fallacy" Ruskin coined "pathetic" directly from the Greek root, thus it did not necessarily denote its traditional meaning/s in (modern) English. Therefore, the adjective on its own does not seem to make much sense in

being affecting the feelings (and this indeed corresponds with the sense of its Polish cognate “patetyczny”). However, the modern senses of English “pathetic” do not embrace this connotation. It is difficult, if possible at all, to adjudicate whether this was a conscious choice on the part of TS (who cannot be consulted on that issue any more) or some kind of inadvertent oversight, discrepancy, or even translation error (see Hejwowski 2004, also in this work). It is also equally impossible to ascertain now whether CL had in mind a modern negative meaning of “pathetic” or the neutral obsolete one. As can be seen, nothing is obvious in the case of this example, both in terms of the source fragment and its corresponding target rendition. The only comment that can be made here is that a direct translation of “pathetic” as “patetyczny” might not fully capture the subtle nuances (e.g. against the background of historical vs. modern senses) and cultural connotations associated with each term in its respective language. Ideally, translators need to consider the broader context and connotations to ensure an accurate rendering of the intended meaning present in the original text, but the latter may not be so unequivocal either.

AW apparently avoids the above conundrum by making use of a formal, scientific, neutral expression “psychizacja przyrody” [psychisation of nature], which appears to be a case of particularisation. One may also suppose that this is an example of a temporary equivalence, so the technique of discursive creation, but this is not the case. This phrase, along with others, like “antropomorfizacja” [anthropomorphisation] or “reifikacja” [reification], has already been entered into numerous (both traditional and on-line) dictionaries, so it may be treated as a fixed entrenched expression.

Finally, CLs explication of the pathetic fallacy, which is “reading into the beasts a self”, gives translators a chance to pursue diverse stylistic solutions. The construal of “reading something into something else” in English contains a somewhat negative connotation of believing that something has a particular meaning when in reality it has not, or of discerning in or inferring from a statement the meanings not intended by the speaker or writer.¹¹ Also, English “beast”, being a formal or literary synonym for an animal, may also be endowed with a negative connotation, indicating specifically a (mythical) fierce animal. The translators distribute these connotative nuances by creating diverse configurations in their Polish and Spanish renditions. BC’s “de atribuir a las bestias un «yo»” [of attributing to the beasts an I] is slightly more formal than BH’s

Ruskin’s coinage, as it only works in the entrenched, specific meaning of the expression at hand.

11| See the definitions from Cambridge Dictionary (<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/pl/dictionary/english-polish/read-sth-into-sth?q=read+into>, accessed: (27.03.2023), and the Free Dictionary (<https://www.thefreedictionary.com/read+into>, accessed: 27.03.2023).

“de ver en las bestias un yo” [to see in the beasts an I], but both of them, again, take advantage of the fact that English “beast” and Spanish “bestia” are semantic cognates. TS’s rendition “dopatrywania się w nich istnienia ‘ja’” [of discerning in them the existence of I] is comparable to that of BH, as both of these translations rely on the visual construal by employing verbs of perception: “dopatrywać (się)” [to discern] and “ver” [to see] respectively. Beasts in TS’s versions are omitted, as he uses the pronoun “them”, which is coreferential with “zwierzęta” [animals]. AW’s translation, for a change, corresponds with that of BC, as they both resort to the equivalent verbs, “przypisywać” and “atribuir” [to attribute] respectively. Again, AW avoids “beasts” and employs a formal equivalent of “self” popular in Polish philosophical discourse, namely “jaźń” [selfhood].

5. Conclusions

Though C. S. Lewis’s theological/philosophical discourse may pose a translatory challenge, I cautiously argue that, on the whole, the four translators whose work I analyse have been successful while rendering Lewis’s ideas into Polish and Spanish. To try and validate such a general claim, at least partly, I resorted to the components of House’s translation quality assessment model (2001) and applied them to the precedent analysis.

The pinpointing of and the painstaking discussion on specific translation techniques (Molina/Hurtado Albir 2002) applied by the Polish and Spanish translators may suggest that they make recourse to many of them (perhaps with the exception of adaptation, compensation, description, discursive creation, linguistic amplification, linguistic compression, substitution, and variation) in order to adjust and “regulate” their usage accordingly, to adequately convey the richness of the original message to the effect that “an original and its overt translation are to be equivalent at the level of Language/Text and Register as well as Genre” (House 2001: 250).

While comparatively juxtaposing specific lexical, morphological, and syntactic structures present in Lewis’s text with their corresponding “solutions” applied by the two Polish translators Szafrąński and Wojtasik, I made an observation concerning rather modern/neutral renditions of certain fragments created by Szafrąński, responsible for the first Polish translation and more stylised archaic renditions of Wojtasik, the one creating the Polish retranslation. This prompts me here to ponder one point in the context of Berman’s theory on older and newer translations. Can it be really so (provided that the above-delineated tendency between Szafrąński and Wojtasik “persists” systematically) that the first Polish translation of Lewis’s work is more domesticating and Wojtasik’s retranslation is more foreignising? That would mean that the former strives to domesticate the original text by incorporating into his translation more neutral and modern

language, whereas the latter endeavours to foreignise it by weaving into his translation more archaic(ised) elements. However, the excerpts of the original in relation to which I made the above juxtaposition represent general field and informal and popular tenor (being two components of register in the understanding of House 2001), so the status quo appears to be preserved between the original and its first Polish rendition, as both texts are written in the comparable register, whereas Wojtasik's archaisation within his retranslation cannot be unequivocally treated as foreignisation, since it actually departs from the non-archaic character of the original fragment. Then, at least the above case does not seem to render Berman's hypothesis feasible. On the other hand, it is Szafrński's rendition of 1996 that holistically emerges as excessively archaic, old-fashioned (this has not been shown in the present article, as referring to numerous such excerpts goes beyond its scope; see analysis of the fragments from Tables 2 and 8) and, somewhat paradoxically, at the same time oversimplistic and informal, thus lacking certain features of academic register. However, the latter objection may be easily dismissed, since the translator may have wanted to make the Lewis's discourse more accessible to a wider readership, not just to academics. Conversely, the new translation created in 2010 authored by Wojtasik emerges as very modern, "keeping abreast" of the 21st-century contemporary Polish. Wojtasik seems to have captured the stylistic and academic (theological, philosophical) "vibes" present in the original. One could even get the impression that in his rendition Wojtasik even "revs up" the academic character of the original, without, however, depriving it of stylistic lightness and clarity (this may again look like a sweeping and impressionistic generalisation, but it is based on my thorough "experience" with and perusal of Wojtasik's rendition). Either way, the above argumentation seems to have turned tables again in the light of Bergman's theory, as the first Polish translation transpires to be rather foreignising/source-oriented and the Polish retranslation reads as predominantly domesticating/target-oriented, which runs counter to Berman's expectations encapsulated in his hypothesis.

As to the Spanish translators, it seems that the renditions created by Barco Collazos and Bunster Hiriart are comparable in their comprehensibility, clarity, and "performance" in precisely and equivalently conveying the content of the original. This appears to have already been confirmed with the help of the House's methodological tool. However, in terms of lexis, Barco Collazos's translation emerges holistically as more neutral as compared to that of Bunster Hiriart, where more specialist theological vocabulary is employed. If this is the case, then through the lens of Berman's theory the first Spanish translation could be labelled as rather foreignising, and the Spanish retranslation transpires to be domesticating. Just like in the case of Polish first translation and retranslation, Berman's assumption is again not confirmed, although further research is needed here.

The interpersonal functional component named within the House's model also presupposes the presence of the implied readers upon whom hinge "the translator's subjective interpretation of the text, but also [...] the reasons for the translation" (House 2001: 255). This is one of the crucial social factors that I am aware of in the context of creating translations but give little attention to here, as not being the focus of these considerations. Indeed, it would be worth establishing whether we may speak of four distinct target audiences (pertinent to and representing four mini-cultures that I postulate earlier) or rather more (culturally) universal Polish and Spanish recipients, especially the ones who are "consumers" of the discussed two retranslations, the target audiences embedded in the second decade of the 21st century. It would be justified to ask questions about the profile of these contemporary recipients, about their expectations, abilities, prejudices, viewpoints (also within the context of the topical spiritual-material divide, since we consider a religious/theological work here). Should 21st-century translators be heedful of such issues as, say, political correctness, unbiased gender-neutral language, or "religious sensitivity"? Should they be overtly explicative and exegetic in their translation, because the reader cannot be bothered to check further and learn for themselves? Or, conversely, should they be very economical and not explicit, assuming that the reader is willing and able to google out everything they want or consult AI on missing information? These questions remain unanswered here but may be addressed elsewhere.

In sum, both Berman's and House's views on the nature of translation and translators are convergent in that any translation (and maybe any translator as well for that matter), at least metaphorically, is never a final(ised) product carved in stone, but rather a processual entity to be constantly refined and perfected (though, of course, factually and technically any translation must be finished at some point to be, for instance, published). A state of being "in the making" (see Wyatt 2012: 34 at the beginning of this paper) is a natural and inherent characteristic of any translator, but this may also apply to their work spatio-temporally, since "[t]ranslation involves text transfer across time and space, and whenever texts move, they also shift frames and discourse worlds" (House 2001: 249). The final and clinching assertion for the present considerations, containing hope for the future, comes from Juliane House: "[I]t must be stressed that despite all these 'external' influences, translation is at its core a linguistic-textual phenomenon, and it can be legitimately described, analysed and evaluated as such" (House 2001: 254–255).

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